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Outraged, yet moderate and 
impartial
The rise of Amnesty International in the Netherlands in the 1960s 
and 1970s1
bastiaan bouwman
This article contributes to the recent historiography on human rights by analysing 
the rise of Amnesty International in the Netherlands. It uses the Dutch section’s 
archives extensively for the first time and explores how, despite the first section’s 
failure to gain traction, upon its second founding it quickly grew into one of 
the largest national sections of Amnesty. Apart from highlighting differences 
in approach between the first and the second group of organisers, this article 
explains the remarkable success of the latter. It focuses on the interaction between 
Amnesty’s ‘model’ and the Dutch cultural and political context, discussing how 
the national section’s leadership mediated this. The organisation capitalised 
on the idealism of the 1970s while steering clear of radicalisation and political 
polarisation in both the national and international spheres. In addition, the Dutch 
section’s approach and message spoke directly to memories of World War ii, while 
organisational innovation allowed it to tap into growing reserves of volunteers and 
members, contributing to a more general shift in Amnesty’s work.
Dit artikel draagt door middel van een analyse van de opkomst van Amnesty 
International in Nederland bij aan de recente historiografie over mensenrechten. 
Het maakt voor het eerst uitgebreid gebruik van de archieven van de Nederlandse 
afdeling en gaat na hoe de Nederlandse afdeling in eerste instantie geen voet 
aan de grond kreeg, maar bij de tweede poging alsnog uitgroeide tot een van de 
grootste nationale afdelingen van Amnesty. Naast verschillen in de aanpak tussen 
de twee pogingen verklaart dit artikel dit plotselinge succes uit de interactie tussen 
Amnesty’s ‘model’ en de Nederlandse culturele en politieke context, zoals
article – artikel
vormgegeven door de leiding van de nationale afdeling. Amnesty’s activisme 
sloot aan op het idealisme van de jaren zeventig, maar de organisatie vermeed 
radicalisering en politieke polarisering op zowel het nationale als het internationale 
vlak. Daarnaast deed de boodschap van de Nederlandse afdeling een beroep op 
herinneringen aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Ten slotte maakte organisatorische 
innovatie het mogelijk een groeiende reserve van vrijwilligers en leden aan te 
spreken, hetgeen bijdroeg aan een algemene wijziging van Amnesty’s koers.
Introduction
The vigorous recent debate on the history of human rights has focused on 
the middle of the twentieth century, from the 1940s to the 1970s.2 Whereas 
established narratives of what is referred to – in shorthand – as the rise 
of human rights have focused on the post-war moment, newer accounts 
emphasise the importance of the 1970s. Although some scholars have begun 
to question the utility of an approach focused on identifying ‘breakthrough’ 
moments, debates on continuity and discontinuity seem likely to carry on.3 
What is relatively uncontested, however, is that the 1970s saw a marked 
increase in the use of human rights language, at least in the West, and that 
a major, if not the defining, element of this development was widespread 
human rights activism. Jan Eckel has written that ‘non-governmental 
organisations can arguably be considered the most important driving force 
behind international human rights politics after the Second World War’, 
and contrasts the relative failure of the International League for the Rights 
of Man to the later success of Amnesty International.4 Writing about the 
Netherlands, the late Peter Baehr held that ‘the issue of human rights has been 
put on the political agenda mainly thanks to the efforts of non-governmental 
1 I would like to thank James C. Kennedy, Piers 
Ludlow, the reviewers, and the journal’s editors 
for their comments on an earlier version of 
this manuscript, as well as Alex Mayhew for 
proofreading the final draft. I also benefitted 
greatly from presenting my findings in the 
University of Reading’s ‘History of International 
Organisations’ seminar, and in particular 
from comments offered by Kiran Klaus Patel. 
This article is based on my Research Master’s 
dissertation, entitled ‘Geëngageerd, maar 
onpartijdig en gematigd. De opkomst van 
Amnesty International in Nederland, 1961-1990’ 
(University of Amsterdam 2013), which is available 
in full at: http://dare.uva.nl/document/508323.
2 Cf. Devin O. Pendas, ‘Toward a New Politics? On 
the Recent Historiography of Human Rights’, 
Contemporary European History 21 (2012) 95-111.
3 Cf. Robert Brier, ‘Beyond the Quest for a 
“Breakthrough”. Reflections on the Recent 
Historiography on Human Rights’, European 
History Yearbook 16 (2015) 155-173.
4 Jan Eckel, ‘The International League for the Rights 
of Man, Amnesty International, and the Changing 
Fate of Human Rights Activism from the 1940s 
through the 1970s’, Humanity 2 (2013) 184.
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organisations’.5 Amnesty International was the most important of these 
and would remain the most authoritative nongovernmental human rights 
organisation in the world until at least the 1990s, when it began to encounter 
serious competition from Human Rights Watch and other organisations.
Amnesty and the rise of human rights in the 1970s
What explains Amnesty’s rise? Scholars have advanced several general 
theories. Firstly, as the Cold War entered a phase of détente during the late 
1960s, discontent with superpower competition and its consequences was 
widespread.6 Amnesty promised to transcend the divisions of the Cold 
War, which it did by taking an ‘impartial’ stance, focusing only on political 
prisoners, not political systems. During its initial decades, Amnesty’s groups 
would ‘adopt’ three ‘prisoners of conscience’ at a time: one from the East, one 
from the West, and one from the Third World. A second aspect of Amnesty’s 
appeal was that Amnesty’s founder, the British lawyer Peter Benenson, 
conceived the project as spiritual in nature. Himself a recently converted 
Catholic, Benenson noted an increasing trend towards secularisation and 
hoped that Amnesty would act as a sort of secularised religious community, 
which would ‘re-kindle a fire in the minds of men’. Not coincidentally, the 
organisation’s symbols and practices, like the candle enveloped by barbed 
wire, were deeply linked to Christianity.7 Furthermore, the accuracy of its 
information played a key role: the organisation’s London-based International 
Secretariat and its Research Department focused on collecting detailed and 
reliable evidence about political persecution. For instance, Amnesty’s reports 
on the Greek junta from 1968 helped establish its reputation as an objective 
source.8 The gathering and dissemination of Amnesty’s information was 
aided by an increase in global connectivity and consciousness during the 
late 1960s and 1970s. This stimulated an increasing number of people to 
5 Peter R. Baehr, ‘Trials and errors. The Netherlands 
and Human Rights’, in: David P. Forsythe (ed.), 
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy 
(New York 2000) 57.
6 Cf. Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global 
Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, ma 
and London 2003).
7 Tom Buchanan, ‘The Truth Will Set You Free. 
The Making of Amnesty International’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 37 (2002) 575-597; Stephen 
Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame. Understanding 
Amnesty International (Ithaca 2006).
8 Barbara Keys, ‘Anti-Torture Politics. Amnesty 
International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins 
of the Human Rights “Boom” in the United 
States’, in: Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde and William I. 
Hitchcock (eds.), The Human Rights Revolution. 
An International History (New York et al. 2012) 
202-203.
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become concerned about global issues, including human rights.9 Finally, 
Samuel Moyn has recently suggested that the attraction of human rights, 
and of Amnesty in particular, lay in a general disillusion with ‘transformative 
utopias’, particularly those of reformed socialism and student revolts. People 
began to turn to ‘minimalist utopias’ of the kind that Amnesty was able to 
offer through its goal of making the world not perfect but merely, in the words 
of one Amnesty member, ‘a slightly less wicked place’.10 Eckel has provided 
a similar account, focused on Amnesty in the United States. However, he 
focuses less on disillusion and more on the importance of participation: 
‘[H]uman rights offered a departure from the dilemmas into which social 
utopianism and ideological rigor had maneuvered the protest movements 
of the 1960s, once they had successfully broken up the anti-totalitarian 
consensus and opened up new avenues for political participation.’ In his view, 
human rights promised to overcome the political polarisation within Western 
democracies and the bipolarity of the Cold War. At the same time, it offered 
direct individual engagement, which catered to a rising demand for ‘moral 
subjectivity and personal politics’.11
Amnesty’s national sections
To fully understand Amnesty’s success, it is necessary to look at how the 
organisation managed to successfully root itself in various societies. As Tom 
Buchanan – who has written the most authoritative articles on Amnesty’s early 
years – has written: ‘[M]ore research is needed to investigate why Benenson’s 
ideas flourished in some national environments and not in others.’12 Eckel 
has pointed out that even by the end of the 1970s the geographical spread 
of Amnesty was highly uneven: three quarters of all its prisoner adoption 
groups were located in just six countries.13 Amnesty’s lack of success outside 
of Northwest Europe and North America was not very surprising, given 
its geographical origins, cultural affinities, and ideological priorities. Also, 
until 2001 members were not allowed to address human rights issues in 
their own countries, which alienated activists striving to overcome political 
9 Michael Cotey Morgan, ‘The Seventies and the 
Rebirth of Human Rights’, in: Niall Ferguson et 
al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in 
Perspective (Cambridge, ma 2010) 237-250.
10 Eckel, ‘The International League for the Rights 
of Man’, quoted in Moyn, The Last Utopia,  
146-147.
11 Eckel, ‘The International League for the Rights of 
Man’, 204. Cf. idem, Die Ambivalenz des Guten. 
Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit 
den 1940ern (Göttingen 2014) 347-435.
12 Tom Buchanan, ‘Human rights, the Memory of 
War and the Making of a “European” Identity, 
1945-1975’, in: Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel 
(eds.), Europeanisation in the Twentieth Century. 
Historical Approaches (Basingstoke 2010) 165-166.
13 Eckel, ‘The International League for the Rights of 
Man’, 205.
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repression in many non-Western countries.14 Moreover, such repression 
curtailed the possibilities for setting up Amnesty sections in the first place. 
Yet even among those countries where Amnesty did, over the course of its first 
few decades, attract a large membership, its development varied. During the 
1960s, the organisation grew at a steady pace in Britain, Denmark, Norway, 
and particularly Sweden, as well as in the Federal Republic of Germany, but 
elsewhere in Europe sections struggled to gain traction.15 Without further 
attention as to the trajectory of individual sections of Amnesty, we lack a 
complete explanation of the organisation’s emergence. This, in turn, is crucial 
for explaining the rise of human rights more widely.
Studying national sections is also necessary if we are to understand 
properly Amnesty’s transnational character. The organisation’s self-definition 
as a movement beyond borders emphasises Amnesty’s essential unity and has 
served to downplay the differences between national sections. This tendency 
is also present in the work of sympathetic chroniclers.16 Political scientists 
who have studied Amnesty’s history and advocacy tend to view it as a single 
‘non-governmental organisation’ which has exerted influence by lobbying at 
the United Nations and publishing trustworthy information on human rights 
violations.17 This perspective focuses attention on the International Secretariat 
rather than national sections. The International Secretariat contained 
the Research Department, which gathered the information that Amnesty 
depended on. It guarded this vital asset closely, leading it to adopt a cloistered 
attitude. But as Stephen Hopgood – who carried out an ethnography of the 
International Secretariat – has acknowledged, national sections could be quite 
distinct from the London-based Secretariat.18 National sections were rooted 
in societies towards which they had to take an outgoing, mobilising approach. 
Moreover, their leadership’s approach could be shaped by convictions that 
differed from those of Amnesty’s founders, at least beyond the foundational 
tenets of the organisation.
Little historical work has so far been done on national sections, in 
part because archival access has not always been forthcoming. But the work 
that has been done bears out the value of studying Amnesty at the national 
level. Lora Wildenthal has produced a valuable account of the initial years 
of the West German section, though this is based largely on secondary 
literature, contemporary journalistic articles by the section’s founders, 
and their reminiscences.19 Tom Buchanan has done archive-based work on 
14 Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame, 98.
15 Eckel, Die Ambivalenz, 362 and 352-353.
16 E.g. Jonathan Power, Like Water on Stone: The Story 
of Amnesty International (Boston 2001).
17 E.g. Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: 
Amnesty International in International Politics 
(Princeton 2001).
18 Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame, ix.
19 Lora Wildenthal, The Language of Human Rights in 
West Germany (Philadelphia 2013).
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Amnesty’s earliest years in Britain, but has focused on the International 
Secretariat and the international leadership rather than the British national 
section (although these were closely intertwined at the time). Up until 
now it has been the American section that has been the subject of the most 
rigorous archival research, most notably by Kenneth Cmiel, Sarah Snyder, 
and Jan Eckel.20 We might, though, aspire to a history of Amnesty which 
integrates a large number of sections, so as to develop a more complete 
account of why Benenson’s message resonated more in one country and less 
in another.
The Dutch section of Amnesty provides a particularly important 
case. Although it initially struggled, the section became exceptionally 
successful at growing its membership, which allowed it to exert significant 
influence. It was founded in 1968, seven years after Amnesty’s initial 
appeal, and by 1970 had acquired 200 members.21 Yet by 1972 the 
organisation had grown to 7.000 members, which suddenly made it, 
according to its secretary, the largest Amnesty section not only in relative 
but also in absolute terms.22 In 1977, the year Amnesty won the Nobel Peace 
Prize, the organisation as a whole had roughly 180.000 members – one in 
about five of whom was Dutch.23 More recently, in 2009, Amnesty in the 
Netherlands reached its peak of over 300.000 members, almost 2 per cent of 
the population, making it the largest in absolute terms after the American 
section.24 How did the Dutch section establish such a prominent position 
in Dutch society? This story, based on extensive research in the archives of 
the Dutch section, reflects on both wider developments in Dutch society 
in the 1960s and 1970s as well as the history of Amnesty and similar civil 
society organisations. First and foremost, however, it throws light upon the 
process by which the Dutch section established itself. This exemplifies how 
Amnesty’s model could be adapted to a given social, cultural, and political 
landscape, and thereby contributes to our knowledge of the wider rise of 
human rights.
20 Kenneth Cmiel, ‘The Emergence of Human 
Rights Politics in the United States’, Journal of 
American History 83 (1999) 1231-1250; Sarah B. 
Snyder, ‘Exporting Amnesty International to 
the United States. Transatlantic Human Rights 
Activism in the 1960s’, Human Rights Quarterly 34 
(2012) 779-799; Eckel, ‘The International League 
for the Rights of Man’; idem, Die Ambivalenz. 
The latter publication also briefly draws on the 
Dutch section’s archives, but focuses heavily on 
the International Secretariat and the American 
section.
21 International Institute for Social History 
(hereafter iish), archives of Amnesty 
International. Nederland (hereafter ainl), inv. nr. 
2, ‘Een schets van de ontwikkeling van Amnesty 
International’ (September 1977).
22 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 7, Brief van Herbart Ruitenberg 
aan de Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde 
van Advocaten, 13 October 1972.
23 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 41, ‘diskussiestuk beleidsplan 
nederlandse a.i. sektie’, 22 November 1977.
24 ‘Amnesty International Afdeling Nederland. 
Jaarverslag 2010’ (Amsterdam 2011) 8.
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From the first to the second founding (1962-1968)
The first attempt to found a Dutch section was made in 1962, but was 
abandoned in 1964 because the organisation could not manage to attract 
sufficient members or funding. In the years after, Amnesty in the Netherlands 
led a slumbering existence. There existed only a few disparate writing groups 
with no national coordination. This makes the section’s spectacular growth 
in the 1970s all the more remarkable. In 1968, a second attempt at founding 
a national section was made by a different group, which quickly proved more 
successful. This can be explained through changes in the political and social 
environment as well as the strategy adopted by the new founders.
The first founding was undertaken under the leadership of the 
journalist and writer Elka Schrijver, who wrote to Benenson on 25 July 1961 
and then proceeded to assemble a provisional organising committee, which 
met several times at the Café Americain in Amsterdam.25 Schrijver had been 
active in the wartime resistance and had been imprisoned in Germany. While 
these experiences drove her to establish a Dutch section of Amnesty, they also 
laid the foundations for her failure. She regarded Benenson and his colleagues 
as naïve, having never experienced occupation, and derided his inattention to 
the possibility of infiltration by communist or fascist elements.26 Although 
Schrijver’s suspicions were to a degree understandable, they led her to adopt 
a highly centralised and guarded approach. She gathered a committee of elite 
individuals, whose reputation was beyond reproach, but who were unable 
to commit a significant amount of their time to the enterprise. She insisted, 
as the organisation’s secretary, on being the central hub through which all 
communications passed. This, given her heavy workload, turned her desk into 
a bottleneck. Under her stewardship, Amnesty was legally incorporated as a 
foundation, instead of an association, meaning it would not have members. 
Schrijver feared that they might maliciously take control of the organisation. 
This approach did not help to mobilise resources or invite initiative from 
other participants. Given its very limited means, the organisation remained 
isolated and had to give up its efforts in 1964.27
Schrijver’s attitude contrasted sharply with that of the leader of 
the second founding, Cornelis van der Vlies. Van der Vlies, a colleague of 
the development economist and soon-to-be Nobel laureate Jan Tinbergen, 
had been active during the first attempt as well, but had found Schrijver’s 
behaviour stifling. He established contact with the British organisation on his 
own, and – in contrast to Schrijver – developed a personal rapport with them. 
He kept working with a small group of adherents in Rotterdam (whereas 
25 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 175, Elka Schrijver aan Amnesty, 
25 July 1961.
26 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 175, Schrijver aan Peter 
Benenson, 1 December 1961, 3.
27 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 171, ‘Mededeling aan de 
begunstigers van De Nederlandse Beweging 
“Amnesty”‘ (1964) 5.
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Schrijver was based in Amsterdam) and in 1966 Van der Vlies even took on a 
position on Amnesty’s International Executive Committee.
In the meantime, Van der Vlies persisted in trying to expand the base 
of people interested in engaging with Amnesty’s work. He adopted a posture 
diametrically opposed to Schrijver’s; in Van der Vlies’ view, Amnesty should 
be built from the bottom up, from a growing base of loosely affiliated writing 
groups into a coordinated national section. Rather than attempting to exclude 
any possible malign influence at the gate, Van der Vlies believed any such figures 
would easily be identified and isolated should they join the organisation.28 He 
therefore took a much more inclusive and open attitude towards new members. 
This yielded a more heterogeneous group than Schrijver had assembled, 
although, as before, its members could be described as political progressives. Van 
der Vlies himself was an avowed social democrat who loathed the ‘pomposity, 
faith in authorities and mental inaction’ which plagued the Netherlands.29 
Whereas Schrijver’s group had consisted largely of politicians, officials, and 
theologians, Van der Vlies gathered a significant number of lawyers around him.
On 18 April 1968 Van der Vlies and his companions once again founded 
the organisation’s Dutch section, but this time as an association. At its first 
general assembly that year, held at the Hotel Krasnapolsky in Amsterdam, 
Amnesty’s secretary-general, Martin Ennals, and the Czechoslovak dissident 
writer Jan Bene ˇs spoke. Although the meeting’s turnout was disappointingly 
low and the response of the press underwhelming, it resulted in a television 
broadcast and almost sixty requests for information.30 Through this and other 
initiatives the organisation quickly attracted a few hundred members, which 
gave it sufficient finances to proceed, thus demonstrating the merits of an 
approach aimed at mobilising as much participation and support as possible.
Adapting to a changing national landscape during the 1970s
Yet while the difference in organisational approach between the first to 
the second founding was surely important, the way in which it meshed 
with a changing societal and political environment was also very 
significant. Within Dutch society during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
several socio-political developments occurred which were comparable to 
those in other Northwest European societies, yet some were particularly 
pronounced in the Netherlands – four of which are discussed below. Both in 
28 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 171, Verslag door Brongersma 
en Van der Vlies van de jaarlijkse conferentie 
van Amnesty te Königswinter am Rhein (20-22 
September 1963), September or October 1963.
29 ‘Deftigheid, autoriteitengeloof en geestelijk 
immobilisme.’ iish, ainl, inv. nr. 171, Cornelis 
van der Vlies, ‘enige opmerkingen over de 
activiteiten van Amnesty’s “Threes’ Groups”’.
30 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 174, Brief van secretaris Mentink 
aan alle bestuursleden, 4 October 1968.
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terms of its message and its organisational approach, Amnesty’s model was 
well-suited to this new environment, and the Dutch section made the most of 
this as its membership and visibility grew sharply after 1970.
Progressive idealism in a ‘guiding country’
The findings of the American sociologist Ronald Inglehart have often featured 
prominently in explanations for the increased interest in human rights. 
Inglehart observed that during the late 1960s and the 1970s a generation 
came of age in affluent and secure circumstances, which enabled it to focus 
on ‘post-material’ issues such as the environment, nuclear disarmament, 
and human rights.31 However – and leaving aside the problems inherent 
in the dichotomy between ‘material’ and ‘post-material’ values32 – this 
explanation cannot provide more than an enabling condition. It does not 
explain why it was specifically the concept of human rights that galvanised 
such support. David Hollinger has argued that ‘[w]e can speak of a “political 
economy of solidarity” because solidarity is a scarce commodity distributed 
by authority’.33 If he is correct, the reasons why Amnesty’s message reached so 
many people and carried such authority are more important than the fact that 
there was a reserve of idealism for the organisation to tap into. Amnesty was 
not only in a synergetic relationship with other internationalist organisations. 
It was also in competition with them for funding, volunteers, media attention, 
and access to government.
From the 1960s on, the notion that the Netherlands was – or should 
be – a ‘guiding country’ gained currency among progressive circles. The 
argument went that its small size and supposed long-standing humanitarian 
tradition marked it out for a role as a global champion of international law 
and cooperation. Such ideas had been espoused by Dutch intellectuals in the 
past, but acquired new prominence as the loss of its colonies relegated the 
Netherlands to a decidedly lower rung on the world ladder. Human rights 
became an important part of this idealism, which was driven in part by 
31 Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution. Changing 
Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics 
(Princeton 1977); cf. Peter Malcontent, Op 
kruistocht in de Derde Wereld. De reacties van de 
Nederlandse regering op ernstige en stelselmatige 
schendingen van fundamentele mensenrechten 
in ontwikkelingslanden, 1973-1981 (Hilversum 
1998); Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, ‘De rol van 
mensenrechten in het buitenlands beleid na 1945. 
Politicologische en historische literatuur’, bmgn 
– Low Countries Historical Review (hereafter bmgn 
–lchr) 118 (2003) 179-192.
32 Cf. Benjamin Ziemann, ‘European Peace 
Movements During the Cold War and Their 
Elective Affinities’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 49 
(2009) 351-389.
33 David Hollinger, ‘From identity to solidarity’, 
Daedalus 3 (2006) 27.
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humanitarian concerns and in part by the desire to develop a new role for the 
Netherlands on the international stage.34 In foreign policy and other areas 
the notion of a ‘guiding country’ was not unique to the Netherlands. Sweden, 
for example, was a similar case, though it lacked the recent colonial history of 
the Dutch. But the ‘progressive consensus’ which emerged in the Netherlands 
during these years was more pronounced than in most other Western 
countries.35
In 1973, the social-democratic Den Uyl government – usually 
considered the most left-wing in Dutch history – came to power. The two 
previous ministers of foreign affairs, W.K.N. Schmelzer and C. Boertien, had 
already given the initial impetus to the development of a concerted human 
rights policy. However, the ministers for development cooperation and 
foreign affairs in the Den Uyl government (Jan Pronk and Max van der Stoel) 
were strongly and openly committed to human rights ideals (although they 
diverged on whether to promote these through public or silent diplomacy).36 
Yet even the subsequent defeat of Joop den Uyl in favour of the more 
conservative government of Dries van Agt did not mean a reversal for human 
rights. On the contrary, in a 1979 policy document, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs institutionalised human rights as an ‘integral element’ of foreign 
policy. This remains fundamental to the Ministry’s work to this day.
Another feature of the newly fluid social landscape of the late 1960s 
was the strength of Dutch ecumenism. Catholic and Protestant elites saw 
a need for ‘renewal’ in order to prevent the faithful from abandoning the 
Church because of its ‘archaic’ character. This sense was especially pronounced 
among those groups which had previously been the most cloistered: Catholics 
and Calvinists. As James Kennedy has argued, the ecumenical movement 
in the Netherlands was exceptionally powerful in comparison with other 
Western states. This was evidenced by the strength of organisations such 
as the Raad van Kerken in Nederland [Dutch Council of Churches in the 
Netherlands] and the Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad [Interchurch Peace 
Council].37 These organisations helped to pave the way for Amnesty by 
34 Peter Malcontent and Floribert Baudet, 
‘The Dutchman’s burden? Nederland en de 
internationale rechtsorde in de twintigste eeuw’, 
in: Bob de Graaff, Duco Hellema, and Bob van der 
Zwan (eds.), De Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek 
in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 2003)  
69-104.
35 James C. Kennedy, ‘Nederland als het meest 
progressieve land ter wereld’, in: Wim van Noort 
and Rob Wiche (eds.), Nederland als voorbeeldige 
natie (Hilversum 2006) 105-118.
36 Malcontent and Baudet, ‘The Dutchman’s 
burden?’, 85.
37 James C. Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. 
Nederland in de jaren zestig (Amsterdam and 
Meppel 1995) 91-94. On the ikv, see Maarten van 
den Bos, Mensen van goede wil. Pax Christi 1948-
2013 (Amsterdam 2015) chapter 3.

‘Amnesty International’ – drawing: man surrounded by barbed wire, Joop Lieverst, 1969. Schweizerisches  Sozialarchiv.
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stimulating engagement in the field of human rights and internationalism 
more broadly. Moreover, from the 1960s onwards, ecumenically minded 
Protestants who wanted to engage with international issues increasingly did 
so through secular organisations. Amnesty provided an ideal vehicle for this.38
Dutch international moral exceptionalism was particularly distinctive 
in relation to another rapidly growing Amnesty section: that in West 
Germany. According to Lora Wildenthal, the West German section was 
founded by intellectuals who opposed the dominance of Konrad Adenauer’s 
Christian Democracy. They deployed the language of universal human rights 
to facilitate a critical perspective on West German politics and undercut 
what they perceived as a suffocating ideology of anti-communism, aimed 
in particular at the German Democratic Republic. Wildenthal has argued 
that the founders hoped that ‘[i]f West Germans honed their sense of human 
rights with work in Amnesty International [...] then most would protest more 
strongly against political repressiveness inside their own country as well as 
elsewhere’.39 The German section was likely an exception in its domestic 
focus; the Dutch section was much more international in outlook.
A distaste for radicalism
Another distinctive feature which provided fertile ground for the Dutch 
section was the low degree of support for radical activism in the Netherlands. 
In comparison with the student riots in France, or the extremism of the 
Baader-Meinhof group in West Germany, the ambitions of Dutch activists 
in general were not so much revolutionary as evolutionary.40 A significant 
number of organisations concerned with Third World politics and 
development did radicalise from the middle of the 1960s onwards. These 
changed from a ‘money-giving and aid-promoting movement’ into a one 
that ‘supported the liberation struggle in the Third World directly and 
indirectly’.41 These organisations at times used the language of human rights. 
However, this was often in the context of solidarity based on political affinity. 
As Patrick William Kelly has argued in the context of activism pertaining to 
Chile, whereas ‘Amnesty saw human rights as an ideology that rose above 
politics, solidarity activists saw it as a means to a political end’.42 Amnesty, 
38 James C. Kennedy, ‘Protestant Ecclesiastical 
Internationals’, in: Abigail Green and Vincent 
Viaene (eds.), Religious Internationals in the  
Modern World: Globalisation and Faith 
Communities since 1750 (Basingstoke 2012)  
292-318.
39 Wildenthal, The Language of Human Rights,  
76-77.
40 Antoine Verbij, Tien rode jaren. Links radicalisme in 
Nederland 1970-1980 (Amsterdam 2005) 11-12.
41 Hans Beerends and Marc Broere, De bewogen 
beweging. Een halve eeuw mondiale solidariteit 
(Amsterdam 2004) 28.
42 Patrick William Kelly, ‘The 1973 Chilean Coup 
and the Origins of Transnational Human Rights 
Activism’, Journal of Global History 8 (2013) 168.
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on the other hand, was always able to appeal to a broad section of Dutch 
society by insisting that it would maintain its impartiality and moderation. 
In the media, the leadership emphasised the pragmatic and realistic nature 
of Amnesty’s work – in contrast to the idealistic approach of other activist 
groups.43
Members of Amnesty did, of course, hold political views, which their 
engagement with human rights fitted into in various ways. Relevant to 
this is Floribert Baudet’s argument that in the Netherlands ‘Cold War anti-
totalitarianism’ dating from earlier decades persisted into the 1960 and 1970s 
and contributed to the rise of human rights organisations.44 Yet while this 
may have been the case for a number of other actors and further research into 
this connection is desirable, it seems that Amnesty’s Dutch membership was 
less concerned with prevailing in Cold War competition than transcending 
it. They focussed either on rectifying the excesses of Western power on the 
international stage, or forming a movement that was unified regardless of 
Cold War divisions. Adherents to the first approach instigated vehement 
internal debates during 1974-1975. These revolved around the question 
whether Amnesty should address the ‘systemic’ or ‘structural’ roots of political 
imprisonment, or whether true impartiality did not include advocating for 
social and economic as well as civil and political rights. But the latter approach 
won out, based upon both principled (the unifying appeal of remaining 
apolitical) as well as pragmatic (the limited capacity of the organisation) 
arguments. As such, Amnesty did not fundamentally change its course and, 
of course, the section’s position within the international organisation put 
a high premium on staying within the limits of the agreed mandate.45 The 
section thus adhered to a restrictive definition of impartiality, which largely 
inoculated it to criticism from both sides of the polarised political spectrum 
throughout the 1970s.
Amnesty’s impartiality allowed it to gain a remarkable degree of 
trust with the government, something that was not shared by most other 
activist organisations. From early on, Amnesty enjoyed good relations with 
important diplomats such as the Dutch representative to the un Human 
Rights Commission, Theo van Boven, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Max 
van der Stoel, and the Chairman-Rapporteur of the Working Group to draft 
the un Convention Against Torture, Jan Herman Burgers. When, in 1979, 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally began to institutionalise its 
43 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 310, ‘Amnesty International 
als de dood om een theoretische praatclub 
te worden. Gesprek met vroegere en nieuwe 
voorzitter’, De nieuwe linie, 3 January 1973.
44 Floribert Baudet, ‘”A Statement Against the 
Totalitarian Countries of Europe”: Human Rights 
and the Early Cold War’, Cold War History 16 
(2016) 137.
45 See the 1974-1975 debate started under the auspices 
of the board: iish, ainl, inv. nr. 1, ‘Discussiestuk’, 
Wordt Vervolgd (May 1974) and on, including the 
many members’ letters sent in response.
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human rights policy, it was Amnesty which spearheaded a group of non-
governmental organisations to form the Breed Mensenrechtenoverleg [Broad 
Human Rights Platform] (bmo). This group served as an officially recognised 
consultative partner of the ministry and soon helped to bring about further 
institutionalisation of human rights in Dutch foreign policy.46 The trust 
necessary for this kind of relationship was only developed because Amnesty 
had remained ‘apolitical’.
In relation to this, an important difference with the narrative put 
forward in Moyn’s The Last Utopia should be highlighted. In the United 
States, the main source for Moyn’s observations, President Carter embraced 
human rights in no small part as an attempt to overcome the sullying of the 
state’s moral character under the leadership of the previous presidents. The 
Watergate affair and the atrocities of the Vietnam War had been particularly 
damaging.47 As Moyn argued: ‘[I]n the face of soiled utopias in politics, 
a nonpartisan morality existed outside and above them.’48 However, as 
Moyn acknowledged, in Europe ‘the mobilisation of the grassroots and the 
intellectuals proceeded without any equivalent to Carter’s role across the 
ocean’.49 Indeed, in the Netherlands, the state’s earlier and more active role 
in promoting human rights – combined with the lack of political scandals on 
the scale of the American ones – meant that it more readily served as a focal 
point for internationalist hopes. The relatively close relationship between 
Amnesty and the Dutch government bore this out. This low degree of friction 
also distinguished the Dutch section from the British section: whereas 
the decolonisation of West New Guinea in 1962 had marked a break with 
the Dutch colonial past, the British state was still actively involved in the 
thorny process of decolonisation in places such as Rhodesia and Aden. Such 
connections had helped generate a crisis in 1966-1967, which saw Benenson 
ousted from Amnesty.50
Peter Malcontent has stressed that government policy only integrated 
human rights as one of several considerations, and did not shy away from 
using human rights as a political instrument. For instance, the Dutch, 
under the leadership of Van der Stoel, were notoriously tough on this issue 
in the negotiations leading up to and following the Helsinki Final Act 
46 Renée Konings, ‘We zijn er omdat iedereen vindt 
dat we er zijn. Het functioneren van het Breed 
Mensenrechtenoverleg in de periode 1979-2010’ 
(ma dissertation, Utrecht University 2011). Cf. 
J. Herman Burgers, ‘Dutch Nongovernmental 
Organisations and Foreign Policy in the Field 
of Human Rights’, in: P.J. van Krieken and Ch.O. 
Pannenborg (eds.), Liber Akkerman. In- and Outlaws 
in War (Apeldoorn and Antwerpen 1992) 157-168.
47 Cf. Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The 
Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (Cambridge, 
ma 2014).
48 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 132.
49 Ibidem, 167-169.
50 Tom Buchanan, ‘Amnesty International in Crisis, 
1966-1967’, Twentieth Century British History 15 
(2004) 267-289.
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(1975).51 Duco Hellema has similarly argued that Amnesty’s work increasingly 
dovetailed with Western governments’ foreign policies towards the end 
of the 1970s.52 This rightly points to the fact that the ‘impartial’ character 
of Amnesty did not give it a Midas touch that turned all those it engaged 
with into proponents of human rights for purely humanitarian reasons. 
On the one hand, the agendas of governments and other actors were in part 
transformed by the inclusion of human rights. Yet, on the other hand, they 
could also selectively draw on the standard Amnesty embodied to serve 
other more politicised goals – such as undermining a Cold War adversary’s 
political stability. Nevertheless, the prior establishment of Amnesty’s advocacy 
as fundamentally ‘apolitical’ was of central importance: the assertion of 
universality through impartiality was what provided even governmental 
human rights claims with much of their power. The entanglement of political 
and humanitarian motives deserves further study, but the appeal of its 
impartiality was what set Amnesty apart and can therefore help explain its 
growth.
The changing memory of the war years
Recent debate on the connection between Holocaust memory and human 
rights has focused on the late 1940s and on the reasons why references to the 
former were so scarce in debates about the latter.53 Moyn has suggested that 
the 1970s ‘breakthrough of popular Holocaust memory’ contributed to and 
shaped the rise of human rights. At the same time he observed that ‘there is 
no serious research’ on the historical intersection between human rights and 
Holocaust memory around this time.54 This makes it difficult to put the case 
of the Netherlands in perspective. Nevertheless, while the subject deserves 
separate study, some tentative observations can be made on the basis of 
Amnesty’s success in the Netherlands.
What stands out as the key moment of Amnesty’s rise in the 
Netherlands are the memorial days of 4 and 5 May 1970. 4 May was the official 
day of remembrance of the Dutch victims of military conflicts from World 
51 Peter Malcontent, ‘Nederland en de 
mensenrechten’, in: Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben, 
and Mathieu Segers (eds.), De wereld volgens 
Nederland. Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in 
historisch perspectief (Amsterdam 2015) 138-141.
52 Duco Hellema, Nederland en de jaren zeventig 
(Amsterdam 2012) 214-215.
53 For two competing views, see G. Daniel 
Cohen, ‘The Holocaust and the “Human Rights 
Revolution”: A Reassessment’, in: Akira Iriye, 
Petra Goedde and William I. Hitchcock (eds.), 
The Human Rights Revolution: An International 
History (Oxford 2012) 53-72; Marco Duranti, ‘The 
Holocaust, the Legacy of 1789, and the Birth 
of International Human Rights Law’, Journal of 
Genocide Research 14 (2012) 159-186.
54 Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of 
History (London and New York 2014) 95-96.
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War ii onwards; 5 May was the celebration of the liberation from the German 
occupation. In the years preceding this twenty-fifth anniversary the way the 
years of the occupation were remembered had changed markedly. In the 
years immediately after the war, the collective suffering of the Dutch people 
had predominated in public memory, while the role of the Dutch resistance 
had been glorified.55 During the 1960s attention shifted towards the plight 
of individuals; persecution became a major theme and collaboration an 
increasing concern. Furthermore, although the Holocaust had certainly 
not been absent from public debate, during the 1970s awareness of this 
particular crime increased.56 This change in public memory was not confined 
to occasions of remembrance. For instance, protesters would frequently accuse 
the Dutch authorities and elites of exhibiting ‘fascist’ behaviour and accuse 
them of a collaborationist mind-set.57
This change was most clearly visible in the content of the celebration 
on 5 May. In 1965, Liberation Day, which was then only celebrated once every 
five years, had had a distinctly apolitical theme: ‘5 May. Have a good time.’58 
While the development organisation Novib distributed a brochure which called 
attention to the plight of people in other countries, such activity was marginal. 
In 1970, the organising committee felt the need to adopt a much more serious 
tone, and chose the motto: ‘Liberty: Also For the Other.’ This phrasing was 
obviously aligned with Amnesty’s message.59 The event’s focus was reoriented 
from the past to the present and the Dutch Amnesty section seized the moment. 
For the commemoration on 4 May 1965 the Dutch section built a makeshift 
prison camp close to the seat of government in The Hague. This installation 
saw several high-profile Dutch citizens wear signs bearing the names of actual 
political prisoners.60 On 5 May, a large event in Amsterdam brought together a 
colourful assembly of speakers and artists. In his lecture, Rabbi A. Soetendorp 
drew an analogy between passivity with regard to National Socialism and 
passivity in the face of the present injustices occurring in the world. He called 
on the audience to take action. The singer Liesbeth List performed sections of 
the Mauthausen Cycle. This piece used text written by a Greek Holocaust survivor 
and had been composed by the Greek composer and political activist Mikis 
Theodorakis, who had only been released from the prison camp of Oropos the 
month prior to the commemoration. The Dutch section also commissioned and 
55 J.C.H. Blom, ‘Lijden als waarschuwing. 
Oorlogsverleden in Nederland’, Ons Erfdeel 38 
(1995) 537.
56 Ido de Haan, Na de ondergang. De herinnering aan 
de Jodenvervolging in Nederland 1945-1995 (Den 
Haag 1997) 118.
57 Herman de Liagre Böhl, ‘Consensus en polarisatie. 
Spanningen in de verzorgingsstaat, 1945-1990’, 
in: Remieg Aerts et al., Land van kleine gebaren. 
Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland, 1780-1990 
(Nijmegen 2001; 1st edition 1999) 299.
58 ‘5 mei. Maak er een feest van.’ Ilse Raaijmakers, 
‘4 en 5 mei. Het herdenken van de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog in Nederland 1945-1975’ (ma 
dissertation, Utrecht University 2008) 123.
59 ‘Vrijheid – ook voor de ander.’ Ibidem, 128.
60 Ibidem, 131.
o
u
trag
ed
, yet m
o
d
erate an
d
 im
partial
69
bo
uw
m
an
distributed a vinyl record of the cabaret duo Sieto and Marijke Hoving. Their 
‘Song of the Rights of Man’ and ‘You Who Now Celebrate Your Liberty’ drove 
home Amnesty’s message: ‘While you celebrate your liberty of twenty-five years/
Know that others crave it dearly.’61 These events garnered a significant amount 
of media attention and precipitated the strong growth of the Dutch section’s 
membership from 1970 on.62
Was the experience of German occupation and the memory of the 
persecution of Jews and other groups particular to the Netherlands in such a 
way as to (partially) explain Amnesty’s rise in this country? Memory of German 
occupation was obviously not a necessary condition for an Amnesty section to 
grow; Amnesty attracted many members in countries that had not undergone 
it. Not all Western European countries that suffered occupation proved 
receptive to Amnesty’s message, however: in France and Belgium sections 
lagged behind.63 Ido de Haan has argued the memory of the Holocaust was 
marginalised in these two countries – in comparison to the Netherlands – 
because of the history of the Vichy regime in France and the foreign nationality 
of the vast majority of Jews deported from Belgium.64 Furthermore, Frank van 
Vree has argued that whereas early narratives of the war foregrounded national 
unity, during the 1960s Dutch wartime memories shifted relatively quickly 
and radically towards an indictment of society’s responsibility for enabling 
atrocities or participating in them. This was coupled with an emphasis on 
victimhood and recognition of the specific groups that had been targeted.65 
This suggests that Dutch Holocaust memories may have been particularly 
manifest by 1970, which helps to explain the level of response to Amnesty’s 
references to the wartime years. The image on page 70, distributed as an 
Amnesty postcard, illustrates how the imagery of concentration camps could 
link Amnesty’s message to wartime persecution.
The rise of ‘light’ organisations, professionalisation, and mass membership
The socio-cultural changes which occurred in Dutch society during the late 
1960s and 1970s have often been called ‘revolutionary’ in their speed and 
61 ‘Lied van de rechten van de mens’ and ‘Die nu 
uw vrijheid viert’; ‘Die nu uw vrijheid viert van 
vijfentwintig jaren, Weet dat u bitter om die 
vrijheid wordt benijd.’ Sieto en Marijke Hoving, 
‘Die nu uw vrijheid viert’ (1970, in possession of 
author).
62 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 7, Cornelis van der Vlies, 
‘verslag secretaris over de periode september 
1968 – mei 1970’, 8 May 1970; ‘Verslag sekretariaat 
over de periode mei 1970 – april 1971’, April 1971.
63 Thomas Claudius and Franz Stepan, Amnesty 
International: Portrait einer Organisation (Munich 
1976) 216.
64 De Haan, Na de ondergang, 206-212.
65 Frank van Vree, ‘De dynamiek van de herinnering. 
Nederland en de Tweede Wereldoorlog in een 
internationale context’, in ibid. and Rob van der 
Laarse, De dynamiek van de herinnering. Nederland 
en de Tweede Wereldoorlog in een internationale 
context (Amsterdam 2009) 33-34.
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Fritz Behrendt, 1981. The author would like to thank Nicole Immler for drawing 
his attention to this illustration. Private collection Renate Behrendt.
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profundity.66 Peter van Dam has criticised caricatural accounts of these 
developments as a sudden implosion of a ‘pillarised’ socio-cultural system. 
He argues that both this term and its corollary, ‘depillarisation’, suggest a 
sharp discontinuity, whereas he contends that sociocultural changes are 
better understood as gradual. Van Dam deploys the notion of a transition 
from ‘heavy’ to ‘light’ communities, coined by the sociologists Jan Willem 
Duyvendak and Menno Hurenkamp, to throw light on this more gradual 
process of change. As Van Dam explains, the new ‘light’ communities were 
based on ‘only a few shared characteristics, a low degree of exclusiveness 
and a strong emphasis on personal freedom of choice’.67 Such communities 
were distinct from specific organisations, since established organisations 
continued to exist while reorienting themselves towards a ‘light’ conception 
of community. For instance, the Dutch Reformed Church had sought to 
become a broad-based ‘popular church’ since the 1940s. It therefore adopted 
a more open and inclusive attitude, becoming ‘lighter’ in the process. Van 
Dam acknowledges, though, that the 1970s were the decade during which 
an orientation towards ‘light’ forms of community became dominant.68 For 
existing organisations, such an adjustment was not easy. A ‘light organisation’ 
like Amnesty, with its identity narrowly defined around engagement with the 
issue of political persecution, could be inclusive to a wide variety of supporters 
from its inception (in the 1980s, the meteoric rise of Greenpeace was to 
provide another striking example).
Amnesty’s model fitted these circumstances well to begin with. Yet 
early on the Dutch section implemented an organisational innovation which 
allowed it to reap the benefits more than other sections: the use of so-called 
‘working’ or ‘action groups’. Amnesty’s model had always focused on the well-
known institution of adoption or writing groups, which gathered a small 
number of people to write on behalf of three political prisoners at a time. It 
was, however, the Dutch section that pioneered the use of groups whose task 
it was to raise awareness of Amnesty’s work and thereby gather members, 
donations, and media exposure. Especially amidst the political ferment of the 
1970s, this way of participating in Amnesty’s work carried an appeal that its 
adoption groups lacked. Action groups therefore helped to attract members 
who otherwise would have preferred to spend their time working for a 
different organisation.
The section’s action groups worked closely with a large number 
of other organisations, most notably religious organisations, women’s 
organisations, and – somewhat later on – labour unions. This spread 
66 Piet de Rooy, Republiek van rivaliteiten. Nederland 
sinds 1813 (Amsterdam 2002) 233-261.
67 ‘[S]lechts enkele gedeelde kenmerken, een 
geringe mate van exclusiviteit en een sterke 
nadruk op persoonlijke keuzevrijheid.’ Peter van 
Dam, ‘Een wankel vertoog. Over ontzuiling als 
karikatuur’, bmgn – lchr 126 (2011) 59.
68 Van Dam, ‘Een wankel vertoog’, 52-77, 61.
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Amnesty’s influence widely. For instance, in 1974 the Raad van Kerken in 
Nederland supported Amnesty by organising discussion groups about the 
issue of torture, which reached approximately 40.000 potential Amnesty 
members.69 By September 1970, Dutch board members had already reported 
great interest from other national sections in the method of working with 
action groups.70 A memorandum sent in 1974 by the International Secretariat 
to all national sections clearly indicated that the international leadership 
and other sections were impressed by the success of the Dutch action groups. 
Other sections were sent information so that they might emulate these ‘groups 
which have been so important in the development of the Dutch section’.71 If 
this method indeed proliferated throughout Amnesty as a result, the Dutch 
section’s innovation not only prefigured but may have even contributed 
substantially to a general shift in Amnesty’s work.
The development of the American section in the 1970s seems to 
have similarly involved innovations in mobilising support. As Sarah Snyder 
has shown, in the 1960s, the American section struggled in a somewhat 
similar way to the first Dutch section. It did not work effectively to mobilise 
volunteers. Instead, its director, Paul Lyons, a former government official 
based in Washington, d.c., focused on publicity and lobbying. Clashes with 
the British organisers of Amnesty ensued and Lyons eventually resigned in 
July 1970. Subsequently, the American section conformed more closely to the 
British model. It incorporated adoption groups, but its efforts at publicity 
continued and resulted in a rapid growth of its membership. Kenneth Cmiel 
has argued that the ‘revelation’ of direct mail in December 1973 – which the 
Dutch tried to emulate, but which never caught on – allowed the New York-
based section to grow its budget from 140.000 to two million dollars between 
1974 and 1980.72 Already from 1974, the American section established ‘Action 
Groups’ analogous to those of the Dutch section. These accommodated its 
growing membership and allowed the organisation to expand further.73
The Dutch shift towards action groups thus dovetailed with a more 
general shift in Amnesty’s work, which was actively supported and promoted 
by the leadership of the Dutch section. During the 1970s, the organisation 
moved away from its well-known technique of writing letters for individual 
prisoners and towards more general public campaigns against torture (starting 
in 1972) and the death penalty (starting in 1977). These aimed at exerting 
pressure on sections’ own governments to take action bilaterally and to enact 
69 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 1, ‘De problemen die 
samenhangen met de groei van Amnesty 
International’, 26 May 1974.
70 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 1, Herman van Geuns 
and Herbart Ruitenberg, ‘Enkele notities 
naar aanleiding van de vergadering van de 
“International Council” op 25 en 26 september 
1970 in Oslo’, 1970.
71 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 124, ‘Action Groups’, December 
1974.
72 Cmiel, ‘The Emergence’, 1243.
73 Snyder, ‘Exporting Amnesty International’, 791.
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and enforce international human rights norms, although they did still use 
individual cases as examples and targets for immediate action. Therefore, active 
membership in the form of adoption groups became less important, whereas 
the size of Amnesty’s constituency was crucial in order to exert pressure on 
the state. An important stimulus in this respect was the establishment of 
the bmo in 1979. This in effect premised access to government on expertise 
and the representative nature of the member organisations. Amnesty board 
members promoted action group work in general because it was more efficient 
and effective than the ‘traditional’ practice of ‘adopting’ individual prisoners 
of conscience.74 By 1978 the active membership of the Dutch section stalled 
and remained stable at around 7.000. Yet its passive membership continued to 
rise by tens of thousands per year. As such, the proportion of active members 
declined from one in six to less than one in fifteen by 1987.75 At the same time, 
the organisation professionalised. While the number of volunteers working at 
the secretariat remained stable at around 150, the number of paid workers rose 
from 14 in 1978 to 35 in 1988.76 Therefore one might say that by the late 1970s 
Amnesty in the Netherlands began to evolve from a grassroots social movement 
organisation towards a mass membership pressure group.
Conclusions
Amnesty International’s rise in the Netherlands shows that local 
contingencies and national contexts need to be taken into account even 
when studying a transnational organisation as centralised as Amnesty and 
developments as widespread as the rise of human rights discourse. Since the 
1990s, numerous authors writing about ‘global civil society’ have asserted that 
borders among activists are vanishing, giving way to global networks that 
increasingly pressure the very notion of state sovereignty.77 As the political 
scientist Sarah Stroup has shown, however, even in recent years, national 
origins and contexts persist in shaping the work of organisations like Human 
Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Oxfam 
74 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 7, Herbart Ruitenberg, ‘Future 
development of Amnesty’, 26 January 1972; iish, 
ainl, inv. nr. 1, Bestuursgroep aktie en adoptie 
(Roel Nijmeijer), ‘Groei en ontwikkeling van het 
adoptiewerk’, 13 April 1977, 6.
75 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 3, ‘Beleidsplan ‘84-’88 
organisatieontwikkeling secretariaat Amnesty 
International Nederland’, 25 February 1984; iish, 
ainl, inv. nr. 4, Voortgangsrapportage uitvoering 
beleidsplan 1986-1988, 13 June 1987.
76 iish, ainl, inv. nr. 3, ‘Beleidsplan ‘84-’88 
organisatieontwikkeling secretariaat Amnesty 
International Nederland’, 25 February 1984, 3; 
iish, ainl, inv. nr. 4, Beleidsplan 1988-1990, 11 June 
1988, 17.
77 E.g. Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights 
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International.78 If this applies to the present, surely it does so even more for 
the Cold War period and before. Even if global connectivity and consciousness 
increased notably from after the late 1960s this should not cause us to lose 
sight of national specificities.
The ways in which the Dutch section adapted itself to its local 
environment fed back into the larger transnational organisation – possibly 
shifting its long term development. Thus, it seems that even though Amnesty 
as a whole became highly centralised, its evolution did not only occur in a 
top-down manner. It remained, in part, a bottom-up process, particularly 
with regard to its organisational aspects – though further research is needed 
to confirm the scope of these dynamics. The interaction of Amnesty’s model 
with the Dutch context was mediated by the section’s leadership, which 
underwent crucial changes from its first to its second founding. After the 
second founding, the Dutch section deftly adapted to evolving cultural, 
social and political circumstances. This agency allowed it to become one of 
Amnesty’s largest and most prominent sections. While its influence waxed 
and waned, it became a lasting focal point for the moral imagination of the 
Dutch population.
The two most salient aspects of the rise of the Dutch section were 
its organisational innovations and its appeal to the memory of the war 
years. Regarding the former, it seems that Eckel was right to emphasise 
the importance of participation. However, the shift towards greater 
professionalisation and mass membership meant that such engagement was 
reduced in importance towards the end of the 1970s. Likewise, although 
Moyn rightly emphasises the appeal of Amnesty as an organisation beyond 
the realm of conventional politics, in the Netherlands it was in relatively 
close proximity to the state. This meant that the importance of its apolitical 
identity might have been matched by its perceived ability to work in 
conjunction and even in cooperation with government. Connecting human 
rights with memories of the war years further cemented the status of 
human rights as being beyond political divisions. Nevertheless, as Hellema 
and Malcontent suggest, in the long run this did not prevent the concept’s 
increasing convergence with Western foreign policy aims in the Cold War.79
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